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THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT "HARD LAW": 
THE BORK REJECTION AND THE 
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Erwin Chemerinsky * 
The recent battle over the confirmation of Robert Bark to the 
United States Supreme Court illustrated a central tension in consti-
tutional jurisprudence: the conflict between wanting constraints on 
judges and desiring flexibility in decisionmaking. For many years, 
Judge Bark had argued that the rights protected by the Constitution 
should be limited to those enumerated in the text or clearly in-
tended by the framers. 1 Bark had criticized virtually every 
Supreme Court decision protecting individual rights as exceeding 
the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society.2 Without a 
doubt, restricting the Court to safeguarding only those rights men-
tioned in the text or intended by the framers would be a substantial 
constraint on judicial decisionmaking.3 However, such a restrictive 
approach to constitutional interpretation would be inconsistent 
with almost two centuries of Supreme Court precedents, from Mar-
bury v. Madison to the more recent rulings desegregating schools, 
reapportioning legislatures, and protecting privacy. Furthermore, 
• Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I am grateful to 
Stephen Siegel and Marcy Strauss for many thought provoking conversations which helped 
shape the ideas in this essay. 
I. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 823, 827 (1986) (courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it 
clearly runs contrary to a choice made in framing the Constitution.) [hereinafter Bork, The 
Constitution]; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 
6 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]. 
2. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note I (criticizing Supreme Court decisions pro-
tecting privacy, expanding state action, invalidating poll taxes, reapportioning state legisla-
tures, and protecting speech). 
3. Of course, even complete fidelity to the text and the framers' intent would leave 
substantial room in interpretation because of inherent ambiguities and uncertainties. See E. 
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 47-52 (1987); Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 207-08 (1980); Wolford, The 
Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 
508-09 (1964). Nonetheless, an interpretive methodology which prevented the Court from 
protecting rights unless there was a clear intent from the framers' would drastically lessen the 
Court's discretion. 
29 
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the strong public opposition to Bork reflected unhappiness with an 
approach to constitutional law that fails to protect a right to pri-
vacy, limits the first amendment to political speech, and omits pro-
tections for women under the equal protection clause. Thus, Bork 
faced a dilemma. He could champion judicial restraint, but at the 
cost of sacrificing protection of rights that are widely perceived as 
essential. Alternatively, he could shift to a more flexible method of 
interpretation, but at the expense of the constraints that he had ad-
vocated for so long. 
At his confirmation hearings, Bork chose the latter course, 
contending that the Supreme Court need follow only the framers' 
abstract intent behind constitutional provisions, not their specific 
views. 4 But virtually any result can be justified as consistent with 
the framers' general objectives. At the highest level of abstraction, 
the framers sought justice, liberty, and equality. What Supreme 
Court decision could not be defended as advancing liberty or equal-
ity? Almost any result-from slavery to egalitarianism, from pri-
vacy to government regulation of matters of reproduction and 
personal autonomy--can be squared with the framers' overarching 
goals.s 
In shifting from the framers' specific objectives to their general 
intent, Bork sacrificed constraint for flexibility. But once he em-
braced judicial review based on the framers' general intent, his 
methodology became indistinguishable from that used by even the 
most liberal Justices. Bork thus made himself indistinguishable 
from all other constitutional scholars, except that he preferred polit-
ically more conservative outcomes. No longer could he hide behind 
a claim of methodological superiority; his divergence from liberals 
was a matter of ideology, not as he long claimed, a better approach 
to interpreting the Constitution. Also, by deviating from a view 
that he had openly and repeatedly advocated for almost two de-
cades, he made himself vulnerable to charges of a "confirmation 
conversion" -a convenient change of mind solely to please the 
Senate. 
The issue of whether the equal protection clause protects wo-
men from discrimination is illustrative of Bork's dilemma and his 
4. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Robert Bark, 
Sept. 22, 1987, quoted in Fineman, The Grilling of Judge Bark, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1987, 
at 27 [hereinafter Hearings]. 
5. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 76-77; Brest, The Fundamental Rights Contro-
versy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 
1063, 1092 (1981); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 378 (1981) 
(describing process of "conceptualizing original intent at a level of abstraction that, in effect, 
removes it as an institutional constraint"). 
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choice. Prior to his Supreme Court nomination, Bork repeatedly 
stated that the equal protection clause only protected racial minori-
ties, because they were the intended beneficiaries of the fourteenth 
amendment.6 Bork repeated this position as recently as June of 
1987.7 Yet, Bork rightly perceived that such a position would make 
his confirmation quite difficult. Thus, at the confirmation hearings, 
Bork abandoned this position in favor of a sliding scale approach to 
equal protection that would provide constitutional protection of 
women.s 
Bork's dilemma, played out before a national audience, has 
long plagued constitutional scholarship. Originalists, who claim 
that the Constitution's meaning is limited to that explicitly stated or 
clearly intended, contend that this alone can provide the needed 
constraint on the power of unelected judges.9 Their view, that the 
Constitution only may evolve by amendment, does limit judicial 
power. Non-originalists, who believe that the Court may protect 
rights not specifically enumerated or intended, maintain that more 
flexibility is essential for society to live under a two hundred-year 
old document that was written for an agrarian, slave society.w 
Their view is that the Constitution must evolve by interpretation as 
well as through amendments. Originalists decry "government by 
judiciary,"11 while non-originalists attack the unacceptable results 
under a Constitution narrowly confined to the framers' views.12 
In this paper, I make three points about the lessons of the Bork 
rejection for constitutional jurisprudence. First, a complete separa-
tion between decisionmaking and the values of the individual jus-
tices is impossible without sacrificing results widely regarded as 
desirable and even essential. Second, the Senate's rejection of Rob-
ert Bork should be regarded, in Bruce Ackerman's terms, as a "con-
stitutional moment" in which society clearly expressed its 
acceptance of a "living" Constitution. Third, the tension between 
desiring constraints and desiring flexibility is inherent in the Consti-
6. Bork contended that since the framers of the fourteenth amendment meant to pro-
tect only "racial, ethnic, and religious minorities," they are the sole groups covered by the 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Bork, The Constitution, supra note I, at 832. 
7. In his most recent statement on the subject, Judge Bork stated: "I do think the 
Equal Protection Clause probably should be kept to things like race and ethnicity." 
Worldnet Interview, in United States Information Agency, June 10, 1987, at 12. 
8. Hearings, supra note 4. 
9. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (I 977); Rehnquist, The Notion 
of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1976). 
10. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(1982). 
II. See, e.g., Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Soci-
ety, 28 WAYNE L. REv. I, 7 (1981); Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 695-96. 
12. See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 66-74. 
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tution; it is a product of the inescapable conflict between wanting to 
entrench certain values to protect them in the future and desiring to 
preserve enough discretion that the Constitution can be adapted to 
govern an ever-changing world. 
My conclusion is that we should accept the solution that this 
country has lived with for decades, if not centuries: a Supreme 
Court, loosely constrained by interpretive conventions and social 
values, with broad discretion to identify and protect those values 
that it deems crucial enough as to warrant safeguarding from 
majoritarian pressures. 
I 
The need to constrain the Supreme Court was a central theme 
in Robert Bork's writings and, in fact, is an obsession of constitu-
tional law scholarship. Under Bork's philosophy adequate con-
straint exists only if there is a method of interpretation that yields 
results unrelated to the ideology of the judges.B Judicial decisions 
are illegitimate to Bork when they are based, even in part, on the 
political views of the judges. Thus Bork wrote: "[A] Court which 
makes rather than implements value choices cannot be squared with 
a democratic society. . . . We are driven to a conclusion that a 
legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the 
will of Justices."'4 
Bork is not alone in taking this position. From the opposite 
end of the political spectrum, Mark Tushnet has argued that liber-
alism "requires adjudication without regard to the values held by 
the adjudicators."'s In fact, as Larry Simon noted, "[d]uring much 
of this century ... the task of explaining the function of constitu-
tional law came to be conflated with a search for a way of con-
straining the Justices."'6 
But constraint in this narrow sense is unachievable except at 
the cost of clearly unacceptable results. Any method of judicial in-
terpretation that would not produce, or worse would prevent, the 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, or the protection of wo-
men under the equal protection clause, or the right to privacy, or 
the reapportionment of state legislatures, should be dismissed as un-
13. Bork, The Constitution, supra note I, at 827; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note I, 
at 6. 
14. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note I, at 6. 
15. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 683, 685 (1985); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John 
Han Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1057 (1980). 
16. Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 606 (1985). 
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acceptable. These results are so much a part of the basic way in 
which this society constitutes itself, as to render unacceptable any 
approach to judicial review that declares them illegitimate. 
These decisions must be understood as a reflection of the views 
of the Justices on the bench at the time about what values are truly 
important. Justice William Douglas wrote that had Brown ht!en de-
cided when it was first argued in 1952, the Supreme Court would 
have upheld, by a five to four vote, the doctrine of separate but 
equa1.11 The death of Chief Justice Vinson and his replacement 
with Earl Warren triggered a sequence of events that a year later 
produced the unanimous decision invalidating state-mandated 
school segregation. Is Earlier Supreme Courts had refused to invali-
date discrimination against women, malapportioned state legisla-
tures, and laws prohibiting use of contraceptives.I9 The shift in 
results cannot be tied to an improvement in interpretive methodol-
ogy. Obviously, the differences in outcomes were a product of 
changes in the composition of the Court and perhaps the passage of 
time and resultant changes in social attitudes. 
Unless Justices are constrained in unacceptable ways, constitu-
tional law inescapably is a product of the ideology of the members 
of the bench at any point in time. The open-textured terms provi-
sions of the Constitution--clauses such as "freedom of speech," 
"cruel and unusual punishment," "due process of law," and "equal 
protection of the laws" -must be given content by the members of 
the Court. Although Justices may explain their decisions as ad-
vancing the framers' underlying objectives or as fulfilling American 
traditions, it is clear that these explanations do not meet Bork's de-
mand for constrained decisionmaking.2o There are so many differ-
ent ways of stating the framers' abstract intentions and so many 
ways of applying them to particular cases as to make it inevitable 
that Justices of different political philosophies will come to diver-
gent results although they all conscientiously seek to follow the 
framers' general objectives. 
This idea-that constitutional decisionmaking often is a prod-
uct of the Justices' values-is hardly new. John Adams worked 
hard to fill the courts with Federalists before he left office, while 
17. W. DoUGLAS, THE CoURT YEARS, 1935-1975 (1980). 
18. SeeR. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975). 
19. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (rejecting on ripeness grounds chal-
lenge to Connecticut law prohibiting use of contraceptives); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 
(1948) (upholding law preventing women from obtaining a bartender's license); Colegrove v. 
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (rejecting challenge to malapportioned state legislatures as posing 
a political question). 
20. For a fuller argument as to how these methodologies cannot provide constraints in 
the sense Bork desires, see E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 110-17. 
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Franklin Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan consistently appointed indi-
viduals committed to their ideological agenda. William Rehnquist 
and William Brennan both are conscientiously performing their re-
sponsibilities on the Court. Can anyone really deny that their fre-
quently divergent results are a product of their sharply differing 
political views? 
The interesting question is why is there such reluctance to ac-
cept the discretion that Justices have possessed and exercised 
throughout American history. In part, the desire to eliminate judi-
cial discretion is a product of a misdefinition of democracy. 
Throughout the recent discussion of judicial review, democracy has 
been defined in purely procedural terms as a requirement that all 
value decisions must be subject to control by electorally accountable 
officials.21 By this definition, judicial discretion to make value 
choices is undemocratic and unacceptable. 
But as I have argued at length elsewhere, a definition of democ-
racy in procedural terms as majority rule, is neither descriptively 
accurate nor normatively desirable.22 Many aspects of the United 
States government, most notably the Constitution, are intentionally 
antimajoritarian. American society is as much committed to cer-
tain substantive values as it is dedicated to the importance of major-
ity rule. Any accurate understanding of American democracy must 
include these substantive values as well as the concept of majority 
rule. Judicial review advancing these values thus furthers democ-
racy even though it involves choices by individuals who are not ac-
countable to the electorate. 
Ultimately, I contend, the problem in much of the current de-
bate is that it begins with a too simplistic and unrealistic definition 
of constraint. As argued above, if constraint mandates a method of 
decisionmaking that yields results wholly apart from the ideology of 
the Court's members, this can be achieved, if at all, only at the price 
of unacceptable results. If, however, the definition of constraint is 
broadened to include all of the limitations that exist on the Court, 
then it is clear that Justices do not have complete flexibility to inter-
pret the Constitution to mean literally anything. There are numer-
ous broad limits on the Court.23 Justices must justify their 
decisions under the language of the Constitution; it is doubtful, for 
example, that the Court could mandate arms control by interpret-
21. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 5-7 (1980); M. PERRY, supra note 
10, at 9 nn.2 & 4. 
22. See Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1984). 
23. For a fuller description of some of the broad limits on judicial review, see E. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 117-28. 
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ing the due process clause. Justices must rely on the other branches 
of government to implement their decisions. Justices sit for a finite 
amount of time and are often replaced by a subsequent president 
with an individual of different political views. I emphasize that 
none of these mechanisms achieves constraint in the sense in which 
Bork desires it; but all together draw the outer boundaries on judi-
cial flexibility. "Constraint" cannot mean a set of determinative 
principles exterior to the values of the Justices. It must be under-
stood as the boundary limits within which the Court possesses sub-
stantial discretion. 
II 
In a recent article, professor Bruce Ackerman spoke of the 
need to understand "constitutional moments,"24 those events that 
shape future views of the Constitution. Professor Ackerman writes 
that "[t]ime and again, we return to these moments; the lessons we 
learn from them control the meanings we give to our present consti-
tutional predicaments."2s Although it is risky to predict that an 
event which is so recent will have lasting significance, I contend that 
the rejection of Robert Bork for a position as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice is such a constitutional moment. 
For decades, Justices and commentators have spoken of the 
need for judicial restraint in order to preserve the Court's public 
credibility and legitimacy. The decisions of Justice Felix Frank-
furter and the writings of the late Alexander Bickel were animated 
by a belief that the Court's public acceptance was fragile, so that the 
Court needed to conserve judicial political capital.26 More recently, 
commentators have warned that the public never would accept judi-
cial decisions if they were thought to be a reflection of the individ-
ual Justices' values. For instance, Professor Daniel Conkle wrote 
that public recognition of substantial judicial discretion "would un-
dermine ... the fragile legitimacy that attaches to Supreme Court 
pronouncements of constitutional law; shorn of their legitimacy the 
Court's constitutional decisions would face all but certain popular 
repudiation and the Court's powerful voice would fall to a 
whisper."21 Similarly, Richard Saphire remarked that a "candid 
confession of the policymaking nature of noninterpretive review 
24. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectu,es: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 
(1984). 
25. Id. at 1052. 
26. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); A. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 201-68 (1962). 
27. Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael 
Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587, 588 (1985). 
36 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 6:29 
may not only undermine its ability to protect human rights ... but 
may also adversely affect its ability to perform an interpretive 
function. "2s 
The Senate's overwhelming rejection of Robert Bork, despite 
his impeccable professional credentials, and the opinion polls show-
ing strong public sentiment for his defeat, reveal that people recog-
nize the existence of judicial discretion.29 The Senate and the public 
knew that Bork's presence on the Supreme Court could affect re-
sults in many cases. They obviously did not believe that the Court 
decides cases by employing a methodology that produces results 
apart from the identity of the Justices. It was obvious to all that 
Ronald Reagan selected Robert Bork because of his conservative 
views and that the issue before the Senate was whether an individ-
ual with these opinions should sit on the nation's highest court. 
Everyone recognized and openly discussed the fact that Bork's pres-
ence on the Court could mean the swing vote on key issues such as 
abortion, affirmative action, and school prayer. 
But not only did Bork's rejection reflect the public's recogni-
tion of judicial discretion, it also embodied a clear repudiation of a 
Constitution that is narrowly limited to the framers' specific inten-
tions. Even conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with a constitutional interpretation that 
excluded protection for women, a right to privacy, and vigorous 
protection of freedom of speech. The Bork nomination was the 
chance for a larger audience to witness and participate in the inter-
pretive debate which has divided constitutional scholars for de-
cades. The Bork rejection was a resounding defeat for originalism. 
Moreover, the Senate and the public demonstrated that they 
not only could live with, but embrace judicial protection of rights 
not specifically stated in the text or intended by the framers. The 
Court's legitimacy is a product of many factors, but it is neither 
fragile nor dependent on a popular belief that judicial decisions are 
the product of something external to the Justices. The Bork rejec-
tion reflects public acceptance that the Constitution is a commit-
ment that certain areas of public life should be governed by 
unelected judges with the authority to decide what values are so 
important that they should be protected from majority rule. As 
such, it is a moment-a moment when public acceptance of a Con-
28. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael J. Perry's Contributions to 
Constitutional Theory, 81 MICH. L. REV. 782, 796 (1983). 
29. Fifty-eight Senators voted against Bork. A Roper Poll, conducted after Bork's 
week-long committee appearance, found that among southern voters, fifty-one percent op-
posed Bork's confirmation and only thirty-one percent supported it. 
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stitution that evolves via judicial interpretation was registered-that 
should shape future debates about constitutional law. 
III 
The very existence of a Constitution creates the tension be-
tween constraint and flexibility. A Constitution exists, above all, to 
entrench certain values, protecting them from easy change by social 
majorities.Jo The primary difference between the Constitution and 
a statute is the comparative difficulty of changing the former. 
Whereas a statute generally can be modified by a majority of both 
houses of the legislature, the Constitution can be altered only 
through an elaborate process usually necessitating approval of two-
thirds of both the House and the Senate and three-quarters of the 
states. 
Why does a nation generally committed to majority rule 
choose to govern itself by a document intentionally made difficult to 
change?JI The simple answer is that a Constitution offers a way to 
enshrine and protect widely shared values-separation of powers, 
freedom of speech, due process of law-from easy violation by ma-
jorities. Judicial review exists to uphold and enforce these values. 
In short, the Constitution exists to constrain society. 
At the same time, it is essential that the constraint not be too 
great. There must be sufficient room to allow adequate evolution so 
that the Constitution can survive and govern in a world far different 
from when it was drafted. Long ago, Chief Justice John Marshall 
recognized that the Constitution must leave discretion for future 
interpretations. Marshall wrote: "[W]e must never forget that it is 
a Constitution we are expounding .... [A Constitution] intended 
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs."J2 
Thus, the Constitution embodies society's commitment to fun-
damental values. If the legislature could overrule those values at 
will, there would be little preservation of the precommitment. Al-
ternatively, if there was no opportunity for evolution by interpreta-
tion, technological and moral progress would make the 
Constitution outdated and a failure at protecting its basic values. 
As explained earlier, a Constitution narrowly confined to its draft-
ers' specific intentions would be unacceptable. 
Judicial interpretation offers a compromise between the two 
30. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1978). 
31. For a fuller development of the functions of the Constitution in American society, 
see E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 25-43. 
32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
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undesirable possibilities. There is evolution by interpretation, yet 
there also is a check on the majority in its ability to disregard the 
Constitution. The commitment to basic values is preserved and en-
hanced by the judiciary's ability to give them contemporary mean-
ing, and at the same time there is some insulation from majoritarian 
pressure. This is not to say that the tension between wanting con-
straint and desiring flexibility is resolved; nor is it to say that the 
Court will always find the right balance. The Court, itself, might 
fall prey to social pressures or it might fail to adapt sufficiently to 
changed circumstances. Yet, I believe that the best way to mediate 
the fundamental tension between commitment and change is 
through a Constitution and a judiciary whose role is to preserve, 
protect, and advance the Constitution's values. 
Tradeoff's and tensions are inherent to the human existence. 
The conflict between wanting both constraint and flexibility, both 
stability and the possibility of change, is a part of every aspect of 
human existence. Whether it is two people deciding whether to 
marry, or two businesses negotiating the content of a contract, or a 
society deciding to create a Constitution, the tension between con-
straint and flexibility is omnipresent. 
The notion of the Constitution as "hard law" reflects a view of 
limited judicial discretion and constraints capable of assuring that 
decisions are not a product of the values of the individual Justices. 
Judge Bork, like many conservatives, argued for this position. 
Bork's rejection reflects the fact that this view simply does not allow 
sufficient flexibility to preserve results that are widely regarded as 
essential. Bork's rejection may lead to a richer debate over constitu-
tional interpretation: one that will advance from the simplistic no-
tion of judicial constraint, the erroneous definition of democracy in 
purely procedural terms as majority rule, and the unrealistic as-
sumption of the fragile legitimacy of judicial review that have pre-
occupied recent discussions. 
